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Conceived as a means to regularly prune outdated regulations from 
agency rulebooks, formal retrospective review is a procedural 
requirement for administrative agencies to review rules authorized 
under a given congressional statute on a regular basis. Yet reformed 
rules proposed under these statutory requirements are often challenged 
by interest groups and rescinded by courts, wasting agency resources 
to draft, promulgate, and defend. Ultimately, the high cost and general 
futility of conducting formal retrospective review inflates the number of 
rules in circulation, creates excessive compliance costs, leads to 
suboptimal use of agency resources, and makes possible the potential 
for arbitrary enforcement of outdated rules. 
 
This Note examines formal retrospective review in light of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s Media Ownership Quadrennial Review 
and now seventeen-year-old Prometheus Radio Project litigation in 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It is the first 
scholarship to propose a formal “thin rationality” arbitrary and 
capricious standard of judicial review for static or deregulatory actions 
promulgated in the formal retrospective review process. By removing 
judicial tariffs on formal retrospective review, an official thin 
rationality standard of review would effectuate the will of Congress, as 
embodied by these statutory “lookback” requirements, and make 
formal retrospective review a viable tool for congressional oversight of 
agency rulemaking—all while working in harmony with the symbiotic 
Congress-administrative agency relationship. 
  
 
 * Executive Articles Editor, Managing Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; Juris Doctor 
Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2021; Master of Arts in Public 
Policy and Management Candidate, John Glenn College of Public Affairs at The Ohio State 
University, 2021. 
  This Note is dedicated to my family and friends for their continual support and 
encouragement throughout my journey to the legal profession. My sincerest thanks to 
Federal Communications Commission Chairman Ajit Pai and staff for their guidance during 
my 2019 clerkship at the Office of the Chairman. Special thanks to Professor Christopher J. 
Walker for his invaluable advice throughout the drafting of this Note and mentorship during 
my time at Moritz. Thank you to the Ohio State Law Journal team, led by Meg Burrell, for 
their hard work throughout the editing process. All errors are my own. 
724 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 725 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE RETROSPECTIVE: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
QUADRENNIAL MEDIA OWNERSHIP REVIEW ............................... 728 
III. PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT V. FCC: A SAGA IN FOUR PARTS 
(THUS FAR) .................................................................................. 731 
A. Creating the Quadrennial Media Ownership Review ........... 732 
B. Prometheus I: 2004 ............................................................... 734 
1. The Rules Challenged ..................................................... 734 
2. The Standard of Review .................................................. 735 
3. The Decision ................................................................... 735 
C. Prometheus II: 2011 .............................................................. 736 
D. Prometheus III: 2016 ............................................................ 736 
E. Prometheus IV: 2019 ............................................................ 737 
IV. FORMAL PROSPECTIVE REFORM: “THIN RATIONALITY” ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW FOR FORMAL RETROSPECTIVE  
 REVIEW ........................................................................................ 738 
A. When Agencies Use Expertise to Promote Liberty in 
Deregulatory Actions, Searching Judicial Scrutiny Is 
Unnecessary and Inefficient .................................................. 739 
1. Conflation of Type I and Type II Errors ......................... 741 
2. Scarce, Difficult to Quantify, or Unobtainable Data ...... 743 
3. Difficulty Satisfying the Amorphous, Political “Public 
Interest” Standard .......................................................... 744 
4. Skeptical Courts Would Be More Consistent in Using 
Nondelegation Analysis .................................................. 747 
B. Thin Rationality in Deregulatory or Static Formal 
Retrospective Review Actions Incentivizes Agencies to Use 
Their Resources More Efficiently ......................................... 747 
C. The Statutory Will of Congress Outweighs Regulatory 
Reliance Interests .................................................................. 751 
1. Reliance Interests for Public Law Regulatory Entitlements 
Require Courts to Give Exceptional Weight to Statutory 
Text .................................................................................. 752 
2. In Formal Retrospective Review, Special Deference to 
Deregulation Is Warranted Under the Governing 
Substantive Statute’s Text ............................................... 754 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 756 
2020] PROMETHEUS: “THIN RATIONALITY” JUDICIAL REVIEW 725 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American rulemaking developed as a means to efficiently respond to the 
ever-changing needs of governance. Significantly expanded during the New 
Deal,1 there has been less enthusiasm for federal rulemaking in the years since.2 
Yet anti-administrativists3 have struggled to pare back rulemaking in the 
executive branch, even when politicians sympathetic to their cause head it.4 And 
yet, although much has been made of President Trump’s Executive Order No. 
13,771, requiring that two regulations be eliminated for every new regulation 
issued,5 then-President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 sought to 
“improve . . . the actual results of regulatory requirements” by requiring 
agencies to develop plans for “periodic[] review [of] existing significant 
regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified, 
streamlined, expanded, or repealed . . . .”6 In short, there is a bipartisan desire 
 
 1 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056 COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF 
RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 17 
(Sept. 2019) (“The Federal Register Act created the Federal Register in 1935 in response to 
the increasing number of administrative actions, laws, and regulations associated with the 
New Deal.”).  
 2 Every president since the Carter administration has required agencies to reexamine 
existing regulations. Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity, & Lisa Peters, 
Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 185–86 (2017).  
 3 “Anti-administrativists,” according to Gillian Metzger, are generally those that “are 
strong on rhetorical criticism of administrative government out of proportion to their bottom-
line results; they oppose administration and bureaucracy, but not greater presidential power; 
they advocate a greater role for the courts to defend individual liberty against the ever-
expanding national state; and they regularly condemn contemporary national government for 
being at odds with the constitutional structure the Framers created . . . .” Gillian E. Metzger, 
The Supreme Court, 2016 Term--Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). But see Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an “Anti-
Administrativist”, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2–6 (2017).  
 4 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (In dissent, then-Justice 
Rehnquist argued that “[a] change in administration brought about by the people casting their 
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and 
benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds 
established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities 
in light of the philosophy of the administration”) (footnote omitted).  
 5 Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6MEZ-MFCM]; see also Keith B. Belton & John D. Graham, Trump’s Deregulation Record: 
Is It Working?, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 818 (2019) (“For the first time in history, the federal 
government has begun to count national acts of deregulation as well as acts of regulation and 
report their ratio each year to the public.”). 
 6 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 13,563 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/cont 
ent/pkg/CFR-2012-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2012-title3-vol1-eo13563.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M924-ZU35]; see also Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 
YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 57, 57–58 (2013) [hereinafter Coglianese, Forward] (“Responding 
726 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
for both procedural government reform, generally,7 and retrospective review 
reform, specifically.8 Perhaps, then, the ends Americans seek are not necessarily 
less government, but more efficient government.9 
In a hypothetical world of perfectly prudent governance, Congress would 
regularly reauthorize or retire agency rules itself, eliminating the need for 
agencies to decide which of their old rules are still appropriate.10 But in reality, 
Congress is highly unlikely to revive its active, labor-intensive role as the 
primary federal legislative body at this time.11 Instead, Congress has selectively 
tried a more passive approach to agency oversight—called formal retrospective 
review.12 Formal retrospective review can take many different forms, but at its 
core, it is a statutory mandate from Congress that federal agencies review rules 
authorized under a given statute at yearly intervals set by Congress.13 Under 
 
to an executive order from President Obama. . . . agencies have collectively completed more 
than five hundred regulatory reviews and initiated policy modifications expected to yield 
cost savings in the billions of dollars.”).  
 7 See Frank Newport, Deconstructing Americans’ View of Government as Top 
Problem, GALLUP (Oct. 27, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/221072/ 
deconstructing-americans-view-government-nation-top-problem.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
9BVS-8PSZ].  
 8 See Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 644 (2017) [hereinafter Walker, Modernizing].  
 9 Compare Max Fisher, Stephen K. Bannon’s CPAC Comments, Annotated and 
Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/ 
stephen-bannon-cpac-speech.html [https://perma.cc/D8E7-KLNG] (Bannon suggested 
President Trump’s appointees “were selected for a reason”: the “deconstruction of the 
administrative state”), with CPAC, Panel with FCC Chair Ajit Pai, C-SPAN (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?441473-17/cpac-panel-fcc-chair-ajit-pai&start=852 
[https://perma.cc/L8Q4-GJ33] (discussion at 14:55–14:59, Chairman Pai stating that “[w]e 
created [the FCC’s] Office of Economics and Analytics to make sure we had a [cost-benefit 
analysis disclosure] process in place”). 
 10 Indeed, while most doubt the ability of Congress to draft legislation, the adoption of 
reauthorization requirements would allow politically accountable representatives to vote on 
the rules affecting their constituents, mitigating the need to resolve such political questions 
by means of judicial review. See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, 
Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931 (2020) (discussing the temporal complications 
of delegation). 
 11 See Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress’s Role in the Modern Administrative 
State, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1101, 1101–02 (2018) [hereinafter Walker, Restoring]. Between 
2015 and 2016, federal agencies added roughly 175,000 pages of rules to the Federal 
Register, while Congress enacted just 329 public laws—3,036 pages in the Statutes at 
Large—over the same period. Id. 
 12 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2012); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–12 (1996). 
 13 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-791, REEXAMINING 
REGULATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF 
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 49 (July 2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07791.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R34T-PDSZ]. Statutorily-required retrospective reviews are generally 
conducted between every two to ten years and have been undertaken at the Departments of 
Agriculture, Justice, Labor, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the 
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formal retrospective review, agencies are statutorily required to “review [their] 
rules [every given number of years] . . . and . . . repeal or modify any regulation 
[the agency] determines to be no longer in the public interest.”14 But though 
these measures require frequent agency action,15 they often produce little 
change16 and create little-to-no benefit for the agency.17 Thus, this Note will 
propose an interpretive or legislative change to the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) that could revive formal retrospective review as a viable means of 
Congressional oversight of agency rulemaking: refining the standard of judicial 
review for formal retrospective review actions18 to allow for “thin rationality” 
arbitrary and capricious review19 in cases involving static or deregulatory 
actions.  
Generally, thin rationality arbitrary and capricious review involves a more 
deferential standard of review than is often used. Arising from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.20 (Baltimore Gas), the thin rationality line of precedent21 exists 
 
Federal Communications Commission; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and the 
Small Business Administration, though almost all federal agencies have standards for 
conducting formal retrospective reviews. Id. at 2–3, 13–14. 
 14 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h); see also, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 610(c) (“Each 
year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules which have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, which are to be 
reviewed pursuant to this section during the succeeding twelve months.”). 
 15 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 6. For example, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service conducted eleven 
mandatory formal retrospective reviews under 5 U.S.C. § 610 from 2001 to 2006, which 
resulted in zero regulatory changes. Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See id. at 7 (“Agencies and others reported multiple factors that impeded the conduct 
and usefulness of retrospective reviews. Agencies reported that the most critical barrier to 
their ability to conduct reviews was the difficulty in devoting the time and staff resources 
required for reviews while also carrying out other mission activities.”). 
 18 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 19 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1355, 1361 (2016). Thin rationality “emphasizes that agencies are constrained by limited 
resources, information, and time, and asks what (nonideal) reasons agencies may have for 
acting inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrarily in light of those limits.” Id. While Gersen 
and Vermeule argue that thin rationality is already the norm in practice, they also note that 
the Supreme Court “displays a better understanding of uncertainty and its significance for 
administrative law than do the lower courts.” Id. at 1391. 
 20 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 105–06 
(1983). 
 21 The precedent stemming from thin rationality “embodies an approach to rationality 
review that is more aware of, and tolerant of, the inescapable limits of rationality when 
agencies make decisions under uncertainty.” Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1359. 
Notably within this line of precedent is Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion for the Court in 
Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019). Though even within 
that opinion, there is a noticeable shift between this more deferential standard and hard look 
review. See Christopher J. Walker, What the Census Case Means for Administrative Law: 
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under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in parallel to the oft-cited “hard 
look” review of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.22 (State Farm) and its progeny.23 Under this Note’s 
proposal, Baltimore Gas’s thin rationality standard would apply when agencies 
take formal retrospective review actions that either (1) remove or (2) do not 
change the legal burden on the public from existing rules. This would leave the 
hard look arbitrary and capricious standard untouched for formal retrospective 
review actions that imposed new burdens on the public.24 
In Part II, this Note briefly summarizes the administrative state’s evolving 
role in American governance, with a focus on the New Deal reforms of the 
1930s. Part III builds on this outline by examining formal retrospective review 
through the FCC’s Media Ownership Quadrennial Review and its Prometheus 
Radio Project litigation in United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Part IV first explains the historical basis for thin rationality arbitrary and 
capricious review, from Baltimore Gas onward, and proposes that thin 
rationality standard apply to judicial review of static or deregulatory formal 
retrospective review actions. Part IV then explains the prudence of thin 
rationality in formal retrospective review and analyzes the balancing of 
regulation reliance interests against agency statutory adherence. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE RETROSPECTIVE: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
QUADRENNIAL MEDIA OWNERSHIP REVIEW 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Americans elected Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt President to take a different approach to fighting America’s plight: 
 
Harder Look Review?, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-census-case-means-for-administrative-law-harder-
look-review/ [https://perma.cc/LF7E-87GD]. 
 22 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 41, 52 
(1983). 
 23 Indeed, “[w]hile ‘State Farm’ as symbol is not the law, there is nothing in State Farm 
itself that is incompatible with [thin rationality review].” Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 
19, at 1361. And because the deferential opinion in Baltimore Gas was decided during the 
same term as State Farm, “[p]lausibly, rather than living in the era of hard look review or 
the State Farm era, we live in the era of Baltimore Gas.” Id. at 1359. 
 24 While retrospective review focuses largely on reducing regulatory burdens, then-
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 explicitly allowed for regulatory expansion if 
retrospective analysis supported it. Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 579, 598 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lookback]. 
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technocracy.25 Informed by prior legislative failures,26 he promoted central 
planning by disinterested experts as a means of more effectively combatting the 
Great Depression.27 As President, he carried out the mandates his four electoral 
victories28 provided by expanding the executive branch29 and establishing 
agencies with newfound authority to oversee economic production through price 
controls and greater regulatory authority.30 
Newly created agencies, such as the National Recovery Administration and 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, were tasked with extensive 
oversight of their sectors of expertise.31 Another newly created agency with 
extensive oversight power, the Federal Communications Commission, was 
created “for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of 
[telecommunications] policy by centralizing authority . . . and 
granting . . . authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire 
 
 25 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency 
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 393. For an explanation of the divide between technocratic 
and democratic values in administrative law, see Cass R. Sunstein, From Technocrat to 
Democrat, 128 HARV. L. REV. 488, 489 (2014) (“Technocrats are enthusiastic about a large 
role for insulated, independent experts, immersed in complex questions. Democrats are 
worried that such experts lack accountability and may have an agenda of their own.”).  
 26 See Chantal Thomas, Essay, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the 
United States, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5–6 (2004) (“[T]he Smoot-Hawley Act serves as a 
stinging reminder of the depths of error to which legislatures are susceptible when in the 
throes of minority economic interests.”).  
 27 “[National recovery from the Great Depression] can be helped by the unifying of 
relief activities which today are often scattered, uneconomical, and unequal. It can be helped 
by national planning for and supervision of all forms of transportation and of 
communications and other utilities which have a definitely public character . . . . We must 
act and act quickly.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933) 
(transcript available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
CFP3-8XKP]) (emphasis added).  
 28 Franklin D. Roosevelt, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white 
-house/presidents/franklin-d-roosevelt/ [https://perma.cc/9QEY-4925].  
 29 John Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 205, 206, 
210–11 (2018).  
 30 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Foreword, Administrative War, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1393–94 (2014) (discussing the similarities between the statutes at 
issue in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and noting that “a different complement of Justices in 
Yakus,” consisting of a greater number of President Roosevelt’s appointees, “cited a mix of 
administrative logic and wartime exigency to make a case for broad delegation”). It is worth 
noting here that although federal agencies were significantly expanded during the Franklin 
Roosevelt administration, their existence does not wholly originate from the New Deal. 
Agencies have been part of the American Constitutional system since the founding era. See 
Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law in the Next Century, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 806 
(1978); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 615 (1989).  
 31 See, e.g., Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic 
Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 256 (1982).  
730 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
and radio communication . . . .”32 Bringing together presidential control, 
bureaucratic oversight, expertise, and structural insulation was designed to 
promote prudent governance through a more effective exercise of executive 
power.33 
Despite fierce disagreements among the Supreme Court and the general 
public, the extended popularity of President Roosevelt and his New Deal 
allowed for the reformation of American government in his technocratic 
image.34 Any lingering disagreements over the administrative state’s expanded 
constitutional role were eventually settled with the codification of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.35 In order to legitimize the undemocratic 
nature of rulemaking,36 the APA requires agencies to explain their actions under 
an arbitrary and capricious standard.37 This standard applies to any form of 
regulatory action,38 with an exception only for insignificant changes not 
affecting policy.39 
As evidenced by the shift from legislation to regulation as the primary form 
of lawmaking, the American public has largely accepted the administrative 
state.40 And as a result, the APA has taken on a quasi-constitutional role in 
modern lawmaking.41 But Congress has amended the APA only sixteen times 
since its enactment, effectively leaving twenty-first century rulemaking in the 
compromised procedures of 1946.42 Ironically, American rulemaking exists to 
support the government’s need to quickly respond to societal changes,43 yet the 
 
 32 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 33 Metzger, supra note 3, at 78. 
 34 See id. at 52–57 (detailing early 1930s anti-administrativists opposed to the New 
Deal’s expansion of the administrative state and noting that “after FDR had appointed seven 
new Justices[,] constitutional limits to economic regulation and national administration had 
largely disappeared”).  
 35 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012) (the APA as currently codified).  
 36 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. 
CT. REV. 177, 198 (1983) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deregulation]. 
 37 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 440. 
 38 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 41 (1983) 
(holding that the APA has “no difference in the scope of judicial review depending upon the 
nature of the agency’s action”). 
 39 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 198 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012)).  
 40 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
999, 1000 (2015). 
 41 See Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control over the “Hard-Look”, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2004) (discussing the difficulty of revising the APA, given 
its “general applicability across the massive administrative state and quasi-constitutional 
status”). 
 42 Walker, Modernizing, supra note 8, at 630–31. 
 43 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938) (“[T]he 
administrative process springs from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government 
to deal with modern problems. It represents a striving to adapt governmental technique that 
still divides under three rubrics, to modern needs and, at the same time, to preserve those 
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process for making those adjustments has not evolved itself44—and 
technological advances continue apace, overrunning past rulemaking 
justifications.45 As FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr has noted, regulations are 
easier for agencies to create than to substantively reform;46 this can be attributed 
in part to State Farm’s hard look arbitrary and capricious review.47 And no 
matter whether a result of agency capture, political factors, or simply neglect, 
stale rule preservation risks converting rules from a means of prudent 
governance into artificial barriers to market entry.48 
III. PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT V. FCC: A SAGA IN FOUR PARTS  
(THUS FAR) 
According to Greek myth, the Titan Prometheus stole fire from the gods and 
gave it to humanity.49 As retribution, Zeus chained Prometheus to Mount 
Caucasus and sent an eagle every day to tear out Prometheus’s liver, only to 
have the liver regenerate each night and be torn out again the following day.50 
 
elements of responsibility and those conditions of balance that have distinguished Anglo-
American government.”). 
 44 Cf. Reeve T. Bull, Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU Insights to 
Rationalize U.S. Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 644 (2015) (noting that “the current 
EU regulatory framework was substantially reworked in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and 
continues to evolve” and contains “numerous features that contrast favorably with the 
American approach”). 
 45 Compare Press Release, Ajit Pai, Chairman, FCC, Chairman Pai Statement on the 
Third Circuit’s Media Ownership Decision (Sept. 23, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 
attachments/DOC-359794A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5PM-KTCG] [hereinafter Chairman 
Pai Statement] (citing “newspapers going out of business, broadcast radio struggling, 
broadcast TV facing stiffer competition than ever” as reasons to reform existing media 
ownership rules), with Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 591 (“When agencies issue 
rules, they have to speculate about benefits and costs. After rules are in place, they should 
test those speculations, and they should use what they learn when revisiting a regulation or 
issuing a new one.”). 
 46 Q&A Session with FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr, FEDSOC EVENTS (July 10, 
2019) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (discussion at minutes 2:30–6:00, 23:00–
24:00). 
 47 See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 599 (“Whether or not [the APA, judicial 
review, or OIRA’s procedural] safeguards are excessive, optimal, or insufficient, they do 
ensure that the regulatory lookback is not as expeditious as many would like. Rules may be 
excessive or unjustified, but in most cases, their simplification and repeal requires use of a 
time-consuming process.”) (emphasis added). 
 48 See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle 
Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 881 (1973); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 279 (1986) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Factions]. For analysis of the rent-seeking behavior that can emerge from artificial 
scarcity, see Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 577–79 (1982). 
 49 Contexts -- Myths -- Prometheus, UNIV. PENNSYLVANIA, http://knarf.english.upenn. 
edu/Contexts/prometh.html [https://perma.cc/8QWX-R4P8]. 
 50 Id. 
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This ancient myth’s endless cycle of pain reflects the modern tragedy of formal 
retrospective review, as shown by the litigation that shares this ancient Titan’s 
name.  
Under formal retrospective review, Congress mandates that agencies take a 
retrospective “lookback” at their existing rules, forcing agencies to regularly 
justify those rules’ existence.51 One of those instances is the FCC’s formal 
review of media ownership rules (Quadrennial Review).52 In the latest edition 
of the Quadrennial Review, the FCC sought to update its rules governing the 
media marketplace by adjusting its media ownership regulations,53 but the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals blocked those changes, holding them to be arbitrary 
and capricious.54 This decision was just the latest55 in an ongoing regulatory 
saga with profound implications for the media landscape—especially the 
viability of traditional media outlets, such as newspapers—going forward.56 
This Part examines the extended back-and-forth of the ongoing Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC litigation at the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, stemming 
from the FCC’s quadrennial media ownership formal retrospective review. 
A. Creating the Quadrennial Media Ownership Review 
Created as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Quadrennial 
Review requires the FCC to “determine whether any of such [broadcast 
 
 51 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 188. 
 52 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–
12 (1996). The 2004 amendment transformed the biennial review requirement into a 
quadrennial review requirement. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 (2004). 
 53 See Prometheus Radio Project (Prometheus IV) v. FCC, 939 F.3d 567, 572 (3d Cir. 
2019), cert. granted, No. 19–1231, 2020 WL 5847134 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 54 Id. at 573, 577. 
 55 Id. at 572. 
 56 Compare Nan Whaley & Michael Copps, The Dayton Daily News Is About to Shrink. 
The FCC Shouldn’t Have Allowed It: Dayton Mayor, USA TODAY (Jan. 2, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/02/facilitation-fcc-dayton-daily-news-
shrink-column/2742642001/ [https://perma.cc/K36P-GBGU] (“As the mayor of Dayton and 
a former FCC commissioner, we are coming together to share our concern about [media 
consolidation]. The FCC’s deal with Apollo [Global Management] allows the private equity 
firm to own a significant amount of media. History has shown that the quality of news and 
information has greatly diminished under private equity control.”), with In the Matter of 2014 
Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864, 10,048 (2016) (Dissenting Statement 
of Comm’r Pai) (“The National Association of Broadcasters has pointed to no fewer than 15 
studies demonstrating that newspaper-television cross-ownership increases the quantity 
and/or quality of news broadcast by cross-owned television stations. . . . In Dayton, for 
example: Cox Media Group’s cross-ownership of the Dayton Daily News and CBS affiliate 
WHIO-TV helped to uncover one of the most prominent stories of [2014]: the 
mismanagement of the Department of Veterans Affairs. . . . [T]reatment delays would not 
have come to light had it not been for the dogged efforts of both the newspaper and television 
reporters, working together.”) (citation omitted).  
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ownership] rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition 
[and to] repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the 
public interest.”57 In theory, the purpose of this formal retrospective review 
process is to minimize unnecessary regulation and promote prudent government 
in times of change.58 But in current practice, formal retrospective review drains 
agency resources59 and invites near-constant litigation from both anti- and pro-
rule parties.60 Congress’s well-intentioned actions have thus resulted in 
seemingly never-ending policy battles, ultimately decided by courts—and rarely 
decided in time for the next review cycle.61 In fact, Congress originally made 
the FCC’s regular media ownership review a biennial requirement under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,62 but, in a telling move, relaxed the 
requirement to its current quadrennial format in 2004.63 
Many have claimed the proper interpretation of the acronym “FCC” is 
“from crisis to crisis.”64 And in regard to the Quadrennial Review, the 
expression fits, as the agency has taken on lawsuits left65 and right.66 One of the 
more prolific litigants in these media ownership challenges is Prometheus Radio 
Project (Prometheus). In challenging the FCC’s revised rules in 2004 
(Prometheus I),67 2011 (Prometheus II),68 2016 (Prometheus III),69 and 2019 
(Prometheus IV),70 Prometheus’s persistent lawsuits have vindicated the claim 
that intrusive judicial review of rules can either “trap[] [agencies] in an 
indefinite cycle of reversal, as the court overturns every new agency attempt to 
make a policy choice, or . . . incentiv[ize] [agencies] to engage in a charade, in 
 
 57 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111–
12 (1996). 
 58 The primary disruptor in this rapidly changing market has been the growing ubiquity 
of the internet. See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 590 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 59 Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, 67 AM. 
U. L. REV. 733, 764 (2018) [hereinafter Coglianese, Improving]. 
 60 See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 573.  
 61 Id. at 574. 
 62 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h). 
 63 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 
(2004). 
 64 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of 
the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 679 (2009). 
 65 E.g., Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 573.  
 66 E.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 537, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 67 See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 372 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (subsequent history omitted). 
 68 See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus II), 652 F.3d 431 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (subsequent history omitted). 
 69 See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus III), 824 F.3d 33 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (subsequent history omitted). 
 70 See generally Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d 567. 
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which they offer the reviewing court bogus first-order reasons to prefer one 
alternative over the other.”71 
B. Prometheus I: 2004 
This litigation began when the FCC conducted its 2002 review of media 
ownership rules. It established a working group, which in October 2002 released 
for public comment twelve studies of the media marketplace.72 Two million 
people voiced their opposition to any relaxation of rules via postcards, emails, 
letters, and petitions, but the FCC, based upon the findings of the twelve studies, 
relaxed its media ownership rules in June 2003.73  
1. The Rules Challenged 
Prometheus sued to prevent the deregulation, which included media cross-
ownership reform (repealing the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule74 
and radio/television cross-ownership rule75 and instituting a single Cross-Media 
Limits rule to regulate ownership76), local television ownership reform,77 and 
local radio ownership reform.78 Notably, the high-profile national television 
ownership rule was not reviewed in Prometheus I, as it had been mooted by 
 
 71 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1387. 
 72 Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 386. 
 73 Id.; Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 645, 
646 (2004). 
 74 The newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule prohibits one entity from owning of 
a television broadcast station and a daily newspaper in the same market. 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.3555(d) (2003); Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 397. 
 75 The radio/television cross-ownership rule regulates the number of television and 
radio stations that may be owned by a single entity, with limits that vary based on the size of 
the market. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (2003); Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 387. 
 76 The proposed Cross-Media Limits rule varied the level of regulation based on the 
size of the Designated Market Area (DMA). In small DMAs, newspaper/broadcast 
combinations and radio/television combinations were prohibited. In medium-sized DMAs, 
one entity could own either a newspaper and either one television station and up to 50% of 
the radio stations that could be commonly owned under the local radio rule, or up to 100% 
of the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule. In large DMAs, common ownership 
among newspapers and broadcast stations was unrestricted. Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 387–
88. 
 77 See id. at 412 (the ability to own multiple television stations in a local market—here 
allowing triopolies in markets of eighteen stations or more and duopolies in other markets). 
 78 See id. at 421 (the ability to own multiple commercial radio stations in a local 
market—here retaining existing numerical limits but changing the method for determining 
market size). 
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Congress,79 who, during the public pushback, enacted a statutory cap on its 
own.80 
2. The Standard of Review 
The Third Circuit explicitly followed precedent for hard look review by 
restating that when “an agency . . . departs from its ‘former views[,]’ [it] is 
‘obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may 
be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.’”81 Indeed, the 
court went so far as to say that although the APA standard of review is more 
deferential where the issues are elusive and not easily defined, “a ‘rationality’ 
standard [was still] appropriate” in this case.82  
3. The Decision 
The Third Circuit first remanded the cross-ownership reform for not 
providing “a reasoned analysis to support the limits that it chose.”83 Specifically, 
a majority of the three-judge panel held that when the FCC adapted the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index84 into its own “Diversity Index” to measure local 
market diversity, it “gave too much weight to the Internet as a media outlet, 
irrationally assigned outlets of the same media type equal market shares, and 
inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index 
results.”85 The majority then remanded the local television ownership rule’s 
numerical limit provision (requiring the FCC “to harmonize certain 
inconsistencies and better support its assumptions and rationale”)86 and its 
expanded waiver provision (requiring the FCC to either “reconsider or justify 
its decision to expand the . . . provision”).87 Finally, the majority remanded the 
local radio ownership rule for arbitrarily and capriciously retaining numerical 
limits.88 In short, the Third Circuit found that the FCC failed to synchronize its 
new ownership limits with the “‘elusive’ concept of diversity,” despite its 
 
 79 See id. at 396 (the number of television stations a single entity may own on a national 
basis). 
 80 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 
(2004). 
 81 Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 389–90 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 41, 41–42 (1983)).  
 82 Id. at 390. 
 83 Id. at 397. 
 84 An antitrust formula used by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission. See id. at 402–03. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 412. 
 87 Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 412. 
 88 Id. at 421. 
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twelve commissioned studies89 and “the inherent uncertainty regarding the 
prospective effects of structural rules.”90 
C. Prometheus II: 2011 
Prometheus and the FCC returned for the first time in 2011, to argue about 
the 2006 Quadrennial Review.91 After Prometheus I, the FCC had largely 
returned all of the media ownership rules in the Quadrennial Review to their 
pre-Prometheus I form.92 Having effectively returned to the status quo—and 
with the FCC being in the middle of the 2010 Quadrennial Review at the time 
the case was heard—the court remanded only the newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership rule on procedural grounds93 and the FCC’s definition of “eligible 
entity,”94 with instructions for the FCC to make its changes during the then-
ongoing 2010 retrospective review.95 
D. Prometheus III: 2016 
However, because Prometheus II was ongoing, the FCC did not complete 
its 2010 Quadrennial Review on time.96 In an attempt to reconcile its time 
limitations with its statutory duty, the FCC decided to combine its 2010 
Quadrennial Review with its 2014 Quadrennial Review—but even that spilled 
over the four-year cycle deadline.97 Thus, the parties returned once more to 
court, in 2016’s Prometheus III.98 The third time was not a charm for the FCC, 
as the court held that the agency had “unreasonably delayed action on its 
definition of an ‘eligible entity’ . . . and [the court] remand[ed] with an order for 
it to act promptly.”99 In highlighting the agency’s neglect of its statutory duty, 
the court remarked that “[a]lthough courts owe deference to agencies, we also 
 
 89 Id. at 436, 446 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
 90 See id. at 436 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing FCC v. 
Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796–97 (1978)). 
 91 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus II), 652 F.3d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
 92 See id. at 440–42. 
 93 Here remanding for procedural issues stemming from inadequate public notice of the 
proposed rule. Id. at 450, 453–54. 
 94 Id. at 469–70. “Eligible entities” are those organizations eligible for FCC diversity 
programs designed to promote media ownership among certain groups. See id. Here, the FCC 
used a revenue-based definition to avoid potential constitutional issues, but the court held 
that the Commission insufficiently considered a non-revenue-based definition. Id. at 469. 
 95 See id. at 453–54. 
 96 See In the Matter of 2014 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864, 9865 
(2016). 
 97 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus III), 824 F.3d 33, 37 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
 98 Id. at 38–39. 
 99 Id. at 37. 
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recognize that, ‘[a]t some point, we must lean forward from the bench to let an 
agency know, in no uncertain terms, that enough is enough.’”100  
E. Prometheus IV: 2019 
And predictably, that was not enough. In 2019, the regulator and regulatee 
made their latest appearance at the Third Circuit: Prometheus IV.101 To be brief, 
Prometheus once more challenged the FCC’s definition of an “eligible entity” 
for FCC diversity programs, this time as defined in 2017.102 Prometheus again 
argued that, in considering the proposed rule, the FCC “fail[ed] to compile a 
record sufficient to consider its impact on ownership diversity and adopt[ed] a 
definition of ‘eligible entities’ that will not increase ownership diversity—
despite the Commission’s stated intention to do so.”103  
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit majority referenced State Farm’s 
hard look standard three times104 and dismissed the lack of an empirical 
evidence requirement in the text of the APA, holding that the FCC needed to 
commission studies itself.105 The members of the three-judge panel (the same 
panel from Prometheus I) were all well aware that the FCC “ha[d] been busy” 
since this litigation began in 2004,106 but the agency had little to show for its 
efforts.107 After repudiating the FCC’s data and dismissing the claim that 
“ownership diversity is just one of many competing policy goals [the FCC] must 
balance when adjusting its regulations,”108 the court held in favor of Prometheus 
once more, vacating and remanding the rule—this time for “woefully simplistic” 
support, generally,109 and failing to conduct studies on gender diversity, 
specifically.110  
The Third Circuit panel once more retained jurisdiction over the remanded 
issues, remarking that “further litigation is, at this point, sadly foreseeable.”111 
However, rather than settle for a Prometheus V with the same three-judge panel, 
 
 100 Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 158 (3d Cir. 
2002)). 
 101 See generally Prometheus Radio Project (Prometheus IV) v. FCC, 939 F.3d 567 (3d 
Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19–1231, 2020 WL 5847134 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 102 Petition for Review at 2, 4, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 939 F.3d 567 (3rd Cir. 
2019) (No. 18-1092). 
 103 Id. at 4. 
 104 See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 577, 585, 587. 
 105 See id. at 587 (citing Stilwell v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009)) (“It is true that ‘[t]he APA imposes no general obligation on agencies to produce 
empirical evidence,’ only [that agencies] ‘justify [their] rule[s] with . . . reasoned 
explanation[s].’”). 
 106 Id. at 572–73. 
 107 See id. at 589 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 108 Id. at 586. 
 109 Id. at 586–87. 
 110 See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 584–86. 
 111 Id. at 572, 589. 
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the FCC filed for (but was denied) en banc review at the Third Circuit112—and 
has since been granted certiorari at the Supreme Court of the United States.113 
Thus, at the time of this writing, this now seventeen-year-old formal 
retrospective review persists. 
IV. FORMAL PROSPECTIVE REFORM: “THIN RATIONALITY” ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW FOR FORMAL RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW 
In order to overcome bottlenecks in the formal retrospective review process, 
courts should clarify what constitutes an arbitrary and capricious action in the 
context of formal retrospective review.114 Alternatively, but perhaps less likely, 
Congress could formally amend the APA to explicitly establish a distinct 
standard of review for formal retrospective review.115 Either option would result 
in the creation of an official thin rationality standard for static or deregulatory 
actions stemming from formal retrospective review. 
Thin rationality review is a standard of review that recognizes “that 
rationality review should calibrate [agencies’ obligation to justify their decision-
making] with sensitivity to the risk that genuine reasons are sometimes 
incommunicable between experts and generalists.”116 Thus, this standard of 
review would more explicitly adopt a presumption of agency rationality in static 
or deregulatory formal retrospective review actions—only undoing 
“unreasoned agency action.”117 In the case(s) of Prometheus, this standard 
would have ended this now seventeen-year back-and-forth in 2004, saving 
valuable FCC and Third Circuit resources.118 And going forward, this 
sophistication would extend President Roosevelt’s achievement of prudent 
technocratic governance well into the new millennium.119 
 
 112 See Jon Reid, FCC Seeks More Time for High Court Media Ownership Appeal, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/fcc-
seeks-more-time-for-high-court-media-ownership-appeal [https://perma.cc/KV9M-P6M7]. 
 113 See FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, No. 19–1231, 2020 WL 5847134 (U.S. Oct. 
2, 2020). 
 114 As noted by Kristin E. Hickman and David Hahn, common law standards of review 
are often altered by courts “through iterative clarification rather than replacement.” Kristin 
E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 655 (2020). 
 115 See Coglianese, Forward, supra note 6, at 60. 
 116 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1357. While Gersen and Vermeule see thin 
rationality as the rule, not the exception, at the Supreme Court level, they also note that 
“[c]urrent law is actually a mixed bag” at the lower levels of the federal judiciary, an 
indication that a Supreme Court clarification or statutory command may be beneficial, 
especially in cases like Prometheus. Id. at 1358. 
 117 See id. at 1358. Thin rationality only excludes “genuinely ungrounded agency 
decisionmaking, in the sense that the agency cannot justify its action even as a response to 
the limits of reason.” Id. 
 118 See Coglianese, Improving, supra note 59, at 764. 
 119 Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique 
of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 253 (2009) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Agencies] 
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A. When Agencies Use Expertise to Promote Liberty in Deregulatory 
Actions, Searching Judicial Scrutiny Is Unnecessary and Inefficient 
The primary reason for Congress’s creation of and reliance upon agencies 
is expertise.120 Like courts, Congress largely consists of generalists who lack 
the resources to extensively study every issue.121 In this sense, agencies exist to 
“fill up the details” that Congress could not have foreseen.122 Indeed, one of the 
harbingers of the Franklin Roosevelt administration, and its expansion of 
agencies’ role in federal governance, was Congress enacting the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff123—exacerbating the Great Depression and helping lead to President 
Roosevelt’s election in 1932.124 
As a result of this reliance, practical (some would even say inevitable)125 
deference principles126 emerged to allow agency expertise to maneuver day-to-
day management issues.127 However, a lack of political accountability—one of 
the virtues of administrative government128—is also one of its vices.129 To 
democratize this tradeoff, Congress required agencies to explain their actions in 
court under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.130 Although the Court 
 
(“[A]dministrative law[,] including doctrines of judicial review[,] should be structured to 
encourage agency action when it is justified and discourage it otherwise.”). 
 120 See Sunstein, Factions, supra note 48, at 281. 
 121 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the Network Age, 23 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 192 (2009). 
 122 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 
S. Ct. 2116, 2135–41 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining the role for and judicial 
review of federal agencies). 
 123 See generally Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended 
at 19 U.S.C. § 1301-1683(g) (2018)); The Senate Passes the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, U.S. 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Passes_Smoot_  
Hawley_Tariff.htm [https://perma.cc/2Q2P-C5VM]. 
 124 See Nancy Williams, Note, The Resilience of Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 99 
B.U. L. REV. 683, 688, 702–03 (2019) (describing President Franklin Roosevelt’s opposition 
to tariffs and the disastrous consequences of Congress passing, against the advice of 
economists, the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930). 
 125 See generally Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017) (arguing that deference is the natural consequence of 
congressional reliance on agencies to resolve major policy issues). 
 126 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and 
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”); see also Hickman & Hahn, 
supra note 114, at 66–68 (discussing Chevron’s original conception as reinforcing the 
deferential judicial attitude when analyzing agencies’ interpretations of statutes). 
 127 See Seidenfeld, Agencies, supra note 119, at 251. 
 128 See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2097 (2005). 
 129 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 
(2010) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 476 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). 
 130 E.g., Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 440. 
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articulated this standard differently in State Farm and Baltimore Gas,131 the 
APA itself does not textually require agencies to examine all possibilities or to 
ground all actions in hard data.132 Yet in practice, many lower court judges (and 
academics133) have acted as though it imposes an obligation on agencies to 
consider all policy alternatives and to persuade with their reasoning in court.134 
This hard look judicial gloss is not always unreasonable.135 As Chief Justice 
Roberts explained, “[t]he reasoned explanation requirement of administrative 
law . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for 
important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested 
public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the 
enterprise.”136 Yet must judicial review require such hard look safeguards in 
 
 131 See, e.g., Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 
N.C. L. REV. 721, 728, 737–59 (2014) (explaining courts’ first- and second-order grounds 
for hard look review and noting that “[s]ince its adoption of hard look review, the Court has 
used relatively consistent language to describe its approach to reviewing agency policy 
decisions, but has in fact applied the concept of arbitrariness differently in a wide range of 
cases”) (footnote omitted). Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 41, 52 (1983) (citation omitted) (“Recognizing that policymaking in a 
complex society must account for uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is sufficient 
for an agency to merely recite the terms ‘substantial uncertainty’ as a justification for its 
actions. . . . [T]he agency must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a 
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”), with Balt. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 105 (1983) (“It is not our task to 
determine what decision we, as Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to 
determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”) (citations omitted).  
 132 See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (quoting Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961)); see also Sunstein, 
Deregulation, supra note 36, at 210 (“The APA provides no clear authorization for the hard-
look doctrine . . . .”). 
 133 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent 
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
483, 485 (1997) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Deossification]. 
 134 See, e.g., Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1389 (“[A]lthough both State Farm 
and successor cases explicitly repudiate the idea that agencies must consider all feasible 
policy alternatives, many judges act as though there is such an obligation, often without quite 
saying so.”) (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 209 
(suggesting that the distinction between skeptics of active courts and hard look advocates 
was a “belief in a more objective public interest”). 
 135 See Murphy, supra note 41, at 1135 (“[O]ne might expect courts to respond to the 
increased risk of arbitrariness inherent in greater agency power by reviewing its exercise 
more closely, and one might think of the hard-look gloss on the arbitrary-and-capricious test 
as manifesting this impulse.”); see also Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 183–84 
(“The [hard look] doctrine is sometimes characterized as an exercise of federal common-law 
authority . . . .”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1163, 1165 (2013) (arguing that there is extensive, unwritten administrative common 
law). 
 136 Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019). Although the 
agency action in this case (colloquially known as the “Census Case”) was eventually 
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deregulatory or static formal retrospective review actions? There are a number 
of reasons why it may not. 
1. Conflation of Type I and Type II Errors 
In administrative law, the information asymmetry between generalists and 
specialists presents potential for Type I and Type II errors.137 As Alexander 
Hamilton recognized, the constitutional duty of an independent judiciary is to 
be a “bulwark[] of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments 
[curtailing the rights of the public].”138 Therefore courts in pro-regulatory 
actions have a duty to favor Type I errors over Type II, as this strategy protects 
individuals’ liberty from undemocratic agencies acting with the binding power 
of the federal government.139 As Professors Vermeule and Gersen have 
recognized, this is essentially the Blackstone principle: it is better to let ten 
guilty persons go free than to convict one innocent person.140 Applying this 
reasoning to the administrative law context, it is better to invalidate ten rational 
agency actions than to allow one irrational action. Thus, the common law 
“judicial gloss” of hard look arbitrary and capricious review141 is not without 
merit—and scholars are justified in questioning Congress’s ability to take away 
such scrutiny in pro-regulatory actions.142  
But in a deregulatory context, separation of powers justifications for 
extratextual judicial review are less clear. To be sure, the Supreme Court has 
held, in State Farm, that “[r]evocation constitutes a reversal of the agency’s 
former views as to the proper course. . . . ‘There is, then, at least a presumption 
 
remanded on pretextual grounds, in reviewing the agency’s exercise of discretion, the Chief 
Justice cited Baltimore Gas. Id. at 2569 (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)). 
 137 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1357–58, 1398 (“The Type I error is 
judicial failure to recognize tacit expertise when it does exist, resulting in erroneous 
invalidation of agency action; the Type II error is to defer[] to nonexistent tacit expertise, 
resulting in erroneous validation of agency action.”). 
 138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (P.F. Collier ed., 1901); see 
also Murphy, supra note 41, at 1127 (“[T]he rule of law requires that judicial review provide 
some minimum amount of protection against arbitrary agency action . . . .”). But see Daniel 
E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American 
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 65) (on file with 
the Ohio State Law Journal) (describing more demanding judicial review of agency 
oversteps, but not understeps, such as non-enforcement and deregulation, as “put[ting the 
judiciary’s] thumb on the scale against government action”). 
 139 See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 (1939) (citing Arkadelphia Milling 
Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134, 146 (1919)) (“It is a power ‘inherent in every 
court of justice so long as it retains control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct 
that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process.’”). 
 140 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1395. 
 141 See Seidenfeld, Deossification, supra note 133, at 490–92. 
 142 See generally Murphy, supra note 41 (looking at the difficulty of eliminating hard 
look review). 
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that those policies will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.’”143 
Yet agencies do not further bind the public in revocation or static actions. Far 
from it, they liberate the public or do not affect its legal status at all.144 Neither 
Prometheus nor any other media organization can be in violation of an FCC 
revocation action.  
Thus, in revocation actions, the greater concern is not that courts will 
erroneously allow nonexistent agency expertise to rationalize an agency action 
(a Type II error), but that courts will erroneously strike down an agency’s 
rational, yet unsubstantiated, deregulatory action (a Type I error).145 Yet with a 
single standard of review for both burden-imposing and burden-repealing 
actions, the APA’s identical language, as currently interpreted, invites courts to 
conflate their extratextual146 constitutional duty for scrutinizing judicial review 
in defense of liberty (which is appropriate when agencies create legally binding 
rules) with the bare “thin rationality” arbitrary and capricious statutory 
requirement (which is sufficient when retaining or repealing legally binding 
rules).147 As a result, this uniformity inadvertently encourages courts to make 
intrusive Type I errors in both pro-regulatory and deregulatory actions—which 
encumbers agencies’ tacit expertise148 and prudent retrospective review.149 
 
 143 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29, 41–42 
(1983) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 
807–08 (1973)). 
 144 Cf. Stephen G. Wood, Don C. Fletcher & Richard F. Holley, Regulation, 
Deregulation and Re-Regulation: An American Perspective, 1987 BYU L. REV. 381, 411 
(“[I]f the FCC is able to obtain the same results under deregulation as were achieved under 
comprehensive regulation, then deregulation should be considered a success.”). 
 145 Compare Walters, supra note 138, at 24, 42 (describing the judicial review of the 
FCC’s deregulatory net neutrality actions as a potential Type II error, and later noting that 
the costs of a pro-deference perspective “are justified by the policy benefits of allowing 
agencies to structure their enforcement programs and allocate resources as they see fit . . .”), 
with Chairman Pai Statement, supra note 45 (“[F]or the last fifteen years, a majority of the 
same Third Circuit panel has . . . block[ed] any attempt to modernize [ownership] 
regulations to match the obvious realities of the modern media marketplace.”). 
 146 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 210 (“The APA provides no clear 
authorization for the hard-look doctrine . . . .”). 
 147 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1356 (“Courts have sometimes adopted 
an excessively intrusive approach because, acting in the best of faith, they have 
misunderstood what rationality requires.”); cf. Sunstein, Factions, supra note 48, at 280 
(noting that not all agency actions should be treated equally). 
 148 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1357. 
 149 Cf. Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 599 (“It is ironic but true that the procedural 
safeguards that are built into the fabric of administrative law, designed to discipline the 
rulemaking process, create significant barriers to the project of simplification and indeed to 
the regulatory lookback.”). 
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2. Scarce, Difficult to Quantify, or Unobtainable Data 
Moreover, the formal retrospective review problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that communicable data—especially in deregulatory actions—can be 
scarce, hard to quantify, or even unobtainable entirely. Even in pro-regulatory 
contexts, over 40% of major regulations at independent agencies include no 
information on anticipated costs or benefits.150 That is not to say that such 
information does not exist (or even that those 40% of major regulations are 
therefore irrational),151 but that “a reviewing court must remember that [an 
agency] is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the 
frontiers of science.”152 As a result, there can be a difficulty in acquiring such a 
quantification of data,153 due to prohibitive costs, fundamental uncertainties in 
the rulemaking, or simply insuperable estimates.154 Indeed, when President 
Reagan issued his groundbreaking Executive Order 12,291, which initiated the 
requirement of cost-benefit analysis for economically significant rules, he 
recognized then that some costs and benefits would be difficult to quantify.155  
Working in concert with this dynamic, thin rationality review acknowledges 
“that limits of time, information, and resources may give agencies good second-
order reasons to act inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrarily, in a first-order 
sense.”156 In other words, it can be rational to be irrational when predicting how 
to quadrennially harmonize regulation and the market—and vice versa.157 
Incentivizing deregulating agencies to dilute their expertise into arbitrary 
tangibility is not just irrational, it is bad governance.158 Justice Scalia 
exasperated it best: “It is one thing to set aside agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data that 
 
 150 See Coglianese, Improving, supra note 59, at 735. 
 151 Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1376 (“[Q]uantified CBA is a specialized, 
sectarian decision-procedure, not a requirement of rational decision[-]making.”). 
 152 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); cf. 
Bridget C.E. Dooling, Bespoke Regulatory Review, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 673, 675 (2020) (noting 
“the increasing influence of regulatory analysis techniques like cost-benefit analysis on 
judicial review of agency rulemaking, especially over the last two decades”). 
 153 Cf. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus II), 652 F.3d 431, 472 (3d Cir. 
2011) (subsequent history omitted) (“We recognize that there are significant challenges 
involved in meeting [the diversity] goal . . . .”). 
 154 See Coglianese, Improving, supra note 59, at 743, 752. 
 155 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); see also Gersen 
& Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1376 (“Quantified CBA is both disputable and widely 
disputed.”). 
 156 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1402. 
 157 See id. at 1384 (“[R]equir[ing] an agency to justify its decision using the exact 
information that is inevitably lacking is the very opposite of rationality.”). 
 158 Cf. id. at 1398 (“Unable to convey the real, albeit tacit, grounds for decision to the 
reviewers at acceptable cost, agencies will tend to substitute articulable reasons for their real 
reasons. The articulable reasons will fit the agency’s behavior less well than the true, tacit 
grounds of decision . . . .”). 
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can readily be obtained. . . . It is something else to insist upon obtaining the 
unobtainable.”159 After all, how does one quantify and rationalize liberty? 
To be sure, this is not to say that deregulating agencies should not have to 
communicate their rationales. But by creating a de facto presumption in favor 
of their expertise when it comes to static or deregulatory formal retrospective 
review, thin rationality review can “calibrate that obligation [to communicate 
rationales] with sensitivity to the risk that genuine reasons are sometimes 
incommunicable between experts and generalists, or at least costly to 
communicate.”160 At the end of the day, courts and Congress must recognize 
that “[agency] communication itself has a strictly derivative and incidental 
value; it is a strictly evidentiary mechanism, one that helps courts or other 
reviewers to flush out illicit agency motivations by comparing the agency’s 
actions to its stated rationales.”161 And while an agency must “set forth [its 
reasoning] so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s 
action and so [the court] may judge the consistency of that action with the 
agency’s mandate,”162 courts must have the humility to accept that perfect 
clarity to judge such actions cannot always exist.163 In fact, expert agencies 
inevitably operate at some level beyond the comprehension of the generalists in 
the other branches—because that is the nature of the relationship between 
laymen and experts.164 
3. Difficulty Satisfying the Amorphous, Political “Public Interest” 
Standard 
And sometimes, experts must operate beyond any tangible comprehension. 
In the case of the Quadrennial Review, “no matter what the Commission decides 
to do to any particular rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make more or 
less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and support its decision with 
a reasoned analysis.”165 Yet in interpreting its highly malleable “public interest” 
obligation, the FCC will have to base some of its decision-making on what could 
be described as arbitrary and capricious grounds—because these decisions are 
fundamentally policy judgments.166 Simply put, just deciding whether “public 
 
 159 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
 160 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1357. 
 161 Id. at 1396. 
 162 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 
(1973). 
 163 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, Deossification, supra note 133, at 504 (“Often there are no data 
that prove the effectiveness or feasibility of a standard directly.”). 
 164 Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1396 (“In many fields, experts have tacit 
knowledge that they cannot communicate, at least at acceptable cost, to generalist observers 
or other nonexperts.”). 
 165 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 372, 395 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (subsequent history omitted). 
 166 See id. at 435 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (supporting the 
idea that such decisions by an agency are policy judgments). 
2020] PROMETHEUS: “THIN RATIONALITY” JUDICIAL REVIEW 745 
interest” means a public trustee relationship (as it did for the FCC’s precursor, 
the Federal Radio Commission), deregulation (as it did in the 1980s), or any of 
the definitions used in between167 will inevitably require the agency to choose 
amongst equally arbitrary options.168 Making those difficult policy judgments 
is why Ajit Pai, not the Third Circuit, chairs the FCC.169  
Rather than continuing judicial dissonance, thin rationality review would 
require courts to embrace regulatory humility170 and consistently recognize the 
tacit knowledge of agencies.171 If an obtuse court ultimately decides to set aside 
an agency’s action in the name of amorphous statutory requirements, that court 
then has ample opportunity to effectively substitute its own policy judgment for 
that of the agency and of Congress.172 And in so doing, the court will have 
wasted the agency’s limited resources used to draft, promulgate, and defend the 
 
 167 See, e.g., Mary M. Underwood, Notes and Comments, On Media Consolidation, the 
Public Interest, and Notice and Agency Consideration of Comments, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 
196 (2008). 
 168 Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1386–87 (“The hallmark of such cases is 
mirror-image reversibility: the agency’s choice of A over B is arbitrary, in the sense that the 
agency can give no valid first-order reason for the choice, but it is equally true that the agency 
can give no valid reason for the opposite choice either. . . . [A]ny choice [the agency] makes 
would fail ordinary arbitrariness review.”). 
 169 Cf. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (“[T]he Commission’s 
judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial 
deference.”); Schwartz, supra note 30, at 807 (noting that “public interest” is a “touchstone” 
in administrative law and that economic power must be subject to the public interest “as 
defined by the administrator”) (emphasis added). 
 170 Compare Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, FTC, Regulatory Humility in Practice: 
Remarks by FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen 3–5 (Apr. 1, 2015) (transcript 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/635811/150401 
aeihumilitypractice.pdf) (describing regulatory humility as “recognizing the inherent 
limitations of regulation and acting in accordance with those limits” and arguing that because 
“[a]gencies have limited resources,” they “should generally spend those resources to stop 
existing or extremely likely harms rather than trying to prevent speculative or unsubstantial 
harms”), with JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND 
WHY THEY DO IT 286–90 (1989) (Wilson provides examples of “well-intentioned court 
decision[s] having unintended and unwanted consequences” and notes that “like all human 
institutions, courts are not universal problem solvers competent to manage any difficulty or 
resolve any dispute. There are certain things courts are good at and some things they are not 
so good at . . . .”). 
 171 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1396. 
 172 Compare id. at 1373 (“As to any reasonably complex policy problem, an indefinitely 
large number of policy factors are potentially relevant, or can be claimed to be relevant by 
litigants who benefit from delaying agency action. Generalist judges who attempt to sift the 
wheat from the chaff will run every risk of becoming confused, absent explicit statutory 
guidance, and will inevitably end up making de facto policy choices . . . .”), with Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I),, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J., 
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (“[T]he [Third Circuit] has substituted its own policy 
judgment for that of the [FCC] and upset the ongoing review of broadcast media regulation 
mandated by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”) (subsequent history 
omitted). 
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rule.173 Meanwhile, the public will have suffered uncertainty, before ultimately 
losing out on administrative agencies’ most valuable asset: expertise.174 
To be sure, if Congress issues a statutory mandate, an agency is bound to 
uphold that obligation, even under thin rationality review.175 Indeed, some 
agencies have rightfully not modified or eliminated some of their rules during 
formal retrospective reviews because “some regulations are aligned so closely 
with specific statutory provisions.”176 But, as with most interactions between 
the administrative state and Congress, ambiguity in delegation indicates that the 
specific means of enacting policy are to be determined by agencies.177 While 
courts may question the FCC’s relative inaction, a hands-off media ownership 
approach may be justified: in this case, to allow an industry staggering from 
disruption the freedom to regain its footing.178 If removing regulatory barriers 
to entry are, in agencies’ expert opinions, the best way to serve the public 
interest, courts are unjustified in constantly remanding agencies’ actions.179 The 
idea of a rising tide lifting all boats may be difficult to quantify and explain180—
 
 173 See Seidenfeld, Agencies, supra note 119, at 321. 
 174 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1387 (“If the court itself picks arbitrarily, 
substituting its own decision for the agency’s, there is by hypothesis no added benefit 
whatsoever, but there is the extra cost of the judicial proceeding itself, including not only the 
out-of-pocket costs but also the delay in reaching some choice or other.”). 
 175 See id. at 1373; Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 204–05 (noting that all 
agency action “must be reviewed to ensure that it conforms to the governing statute and that 
it is not arbitrary”). 
 176 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 43. 
 177 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 178 See Ownership Limits in an Increasingly Competitive Audio Marketplace: Is Now 
the Time For a New Tune?, FEDSOC EVENTS (July 10, 2019) (on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal) (discussion at 18:00–20:00 stating that “if you want the money to come 
to . . . minorities and women, so they can buy stations, have it be a stronger industry. Because 
right now, it doesn’t matter who you are, you’re having a very, very difficult time raising 
capital”). 
 179 Cf. Gregory Bradshaw Foote, Note, Judicial Review of Rescission of Rules: A 
“Passive Restraint” on Deregulation, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 252, 256 (1984) (footnote 
omitted) (“The greatest degree of judicial deference to an agency’s decision is appropriate 
for rules promulgated under broad ‘public interest’ statutes . . . These statutes typically 
embody only a minimal amount of normative judgment by the legislature, which instructs 
the administrative agency to regulate its subject area ‘in the public interest.’”). 
 180 Compare Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and the Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of 
Sharing and Collaboration Among Seattle’s Craft Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
355, 359, 403–08 (2019) (analyzing the Seattle craft brewing industry’s cooperative ethos, 
which confounds the standard theory of competitive markets, “with special focus on the ways 
in which collaboration can foster innovation and progress, even among direct competitors”), 
with Katie McAuliffe, The FCC Should Modernize by Reducing Cross-Ownership Rules, 
HILL (Sept. 25, 2017), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/352244-the-fcc-should-
modernize-by-reducing-cross-ownership-rules [https://perma.cc/XD88-XFY2] (“Outlets 
that have been allowed to pool resources have produced meaningful investigative coverage[,] 
like when the Dayton Daily News and Dayton, Ohio CBS affiliate WHIO-TV worked 
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but it can be in the public interest nonetheless.181 And if such inaction is truly a 
Type II error,182 Congress, prompted by its outraged constituents, always has 
the authority to narrow agencies’ discretion—as they did in 2004.183 
4. Skeptical Courts Would Be More Consistent in Using Nondelegation 
Analysis 
But again, the open-ended dynamic between agencies and Congress exists 
so that Congress and the public can take advantage of agencies’ expertise;184 if 
courts want to question such leeway, nondelegation arguments would be a more 
conceptually consistent method.185 To argue that agencies may not act in a 
deregulatory manner because such manner is not intuitive to generalist courts 
undermines the symbiotic relationship between agencies, Congress, and the 
judiciary—one that is foundational in the rulemaking context.186 And 
conversely, perhaps anti-administrative jurists would be less apt to scrutinize 
broad delegations if they knew pro-regulatory actions could be more easily 
undone187—or simply changed188—in the future. 
B. Thin Rationality in Deregulatory or Static Formal Retrospective 
Review Actions Incentivizes Agencies to Use Their Resources More 
Efficiently 
Under the current system, deregulatory review inefficiencies are 
compounded by recurring formal retrospective review requirements.189 While 
congressional mandates like the FCC’s Quadrennial Review force agencies to 
 
together to expose mismanagement in the Department of Veterans Affairs. Though both 
news organizations are owned by Cox Media Group, the quality of the journalism did not 
decrease, it increased. Further regulatory reductions would support more of this high-quality 
reporting.”). 
 181 Underwood, supra note 167, at 197. 
 182 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1398 (“[T]he Type II error is to deferring 
to nonexistent tacit expertise, resulting in erroneous validation of agency action.”). 
 183 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 
3, 99 (2004); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 372, 396 (3d Cir. 
2004) (subsequent history omitted). 
 184 See Murphy, supra note 41, at 1131. 
 185 Cf. id. at 1135–36 (“[W]ere judges successfully forced to give up heightened 
rationality review, they might become less tolerant of broad delegations and more inclined 
to strike them as unconstitutional or at least narrow them as a matter of constitutional 
avoidance.”). 
 186 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 187 The tradeoff between the level of scrutiny and the level of allowable delegation may 
indicate the pair are judicial substitutes. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 1128. Were courts to 
be “[d]epriv[ed] . . . of the former . . . over time, they may tighten the latter.” Id. 
 188 See Bull, supra note 44, at 652–53. 
 189 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 185–86. 
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look back at their old rules, agencies largely already do this on their own, in 
what is called informal retrospective review.190 This “informal process . . . has 
important advantages over formal requirements that agencies review all or some 
significant portion of their regulations.”191 This is because “[i]nsofar as [formal] 
requirements are taken seriously, they impose a very substantial burden on 
agency staff.”192 In short, under the current system, generalists micromanaging 
how specialists allocate their time, via drawn-out formal retrospective review, 
can crowd out informal retrospective review from agencies’ agendas.193 That is 
not to say that formal retrospective review cannot be an effective—and perhaps 
necessary194—congressional oversight tool195 going forward, but as it is 
currently implemented, the formal retrospective review process would likely not 
survive a cost-benefit analysis of its own.196 Reform could streamline this 
process for both agencies and courts—and incentivize Congress into taking 
greater responsibility for the state of the Code of Federal Regulations.197 What 
is more, agenda setting by Congress or the White House, while still 
micromanaging to a certain extent, can have a beneficial effect on setting agency 
priorities.198 
 
 190 See id. at 236 (“[C]ase studies suggest that post-promulgation policy changes . . . are 
common and perhaps even the norm for important rules.”). 
 191 Id. at 243. 
 192 Id.; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7 (“Agencies 
reported that the most critical barrier to their ability to conduct reviews was the difficulty in 
devoting the time and staff resources required for reviews while also carrying out other 
mission activities.”). 
 193 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 258. 
 194 Making formal retrospective review feasible could result in a new congressional 
oversight tool that acts as de facto legislative action, thus balancing Congress’s need for 
regular activity, as a means of agency oversight, with its limited resources. Cf. Walker, 
Restoring, supra note 11, at 1120 (noting that “[w]ithout the threat of legislative 
action . . . the efficacy of [Congress’s oversight] toolbox in influencing agency action is 
severely diminished”). 
 195 See id. at 1107 (describing various “tools” Congress has at its disposal to oversee 
federal agencies). 
 196 See supra Part III. 
 197 Cf. Walker, Restoring, supra note 11, at 1101–02 (noting that over 2015 and 2016, 
federal agencies added roughly 175,000 pages of rules to the Federal Register, while 
Congress enacted just 329 public laws—3,036 pages in the Statutes at Large—over the same 
period). 
 198 See Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review 
and Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 282 (2015) (“[P]rioritization is a crucial 
element to any scheme of retrospective review.”); Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 593 
(“A number of officials, at a wide range of agencies, had long wanted to engage in an 
[retrospective review] initiative . . . but time is limited and officials have to set priorities. 
Now the President himself had directed them to act.”). 
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Either through Congress or the courts, eliminating judicial tariffs would 
lower the cost of refining outdated rules for the experts that know them best.199 
And by requiring courts to conduct thin rationality review, Congress will 
incentivize the undemocratic administrative state to refine its existing rules via 
both formal and informal retrospective review.200 In fact, by “deossifying”201 
this process, agencies looking to maximize their limited resources would want 
to repeal excessive rules, so that they do not have to spend resources enforcing 
and, if the rule is part of formal retrospective review, re-justifying it.202 Thus, 
while agencies would be obligated to carry out their statutory mandates—and 
would still want to carry out such mandates in order to receive future 
congressional funding and avoid congressional retribution203—their desire not 
to waste resources on unnecessary rules would shift agencies’ equilibrium 
action away from stasis and toward the optimal level of regulation.204 This 
freeing up of resources would, in effect, reward agencies for keeping their 
rulebooks lean, so that taxpayer funding can be put towards its most productive 
use.205  
In practice, courts can insert their own judgment into agency disputes when 
they tell agencies just how much they may reform.206 As a result, in revocation 
actions, agencies are left trying to effectively prove that the rule in question is a 
clear and convincing net negative for society and that the aims of the authorizing 
statute will still be achieved if the rule is revoked and there is no replacement.207 
This is a high bar, requiring substantial agency resources—even for rules where 
 
 199 Cf. Seidenfeld, Agencies, supra note 119, at 301 (“[Judicial review] raises the cost of 
an agency changing policy or, in other words, it raises the price that the agency faces for 
action. This price rise will discourage agency action overall.”). 
 200 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 257–58. 
 201 See Seidenfeld, Deossification, supra note 133, at 483 (“‘[O]ssification’ refers to the 
inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that agencies must 
clear in order to adopt new rules.”). 
 202 See FCC, FCC 00-346, BIENNIAL REGULATORY REVIEW 2000: STAFF REPORT 3 
(2000); Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 246. 
 203 See Walker, Restoring, supra note 11, at 1107–15. 
 204 See Seidenfeld, Agencies, supra note 119, at 303 (“[D]ifferent procedural 
requirements not only impose different costs, they also provide different incentives for those 
within the agency to advocate agency action, and thereby can affect agency propensities 
toward action.”); cf. Belton & Graham, supra note 5, at 825–29 (explaining regulatory 
budgeting, which forces an agency to prioritize regulatory costs, based on the amount of non-
federal money the agency forces regulatees to spend through its rules). 
 205 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 25, at 393 (noting administrative agencies were a 
pragmatic development to respond to “the social needs of the time”). 
 206 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1387. 
 207 Cf. Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, A Proposal for Improving the FCC’s 
Regulatory Reviews, 12 PERSP. FROM FSF SCHOLARS 1, 4 (2017) (proposing a rule that 
“[a]bsent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the [FCC] shall presume that 
regulations under review are no longer necessary in the public interest” in order to facilitate 
retrospective review). 
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there is little debate about non-value.208 But if cost does not deter agencies from 
attempting to reform rules, arbitrary interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
instructions can frustrate them instead.209  
Courts may believe that they can play the role of philosopher–Goldilocks: 
choosing the amount of regulation that is just right—but that is not the role a 
generalist plays in the administrative system.210 Thus, it is only rational for 
agencies to avoid this indefinite retrospective review when they can.211 Put 
another way, as Daniel Boorstin, the former Librarian of Congress, said: “The 
greatest obstacle to progress is not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge.”212 
By limiting courts in deregulatory formal retrospective review actions, Congress 
can limit judicial activism213 and encourage efficient government—all without 
changing its current agency-dependent nature. If anything, in giving agencies 
the leeway to regularly refine their regulatory role as they see best, based on 
their limited resources,214 Congress could relieve itself of the need to evaluate 
or reauthorize agencies actions at all—which, if nothing else, makes this 
proposal politically viable. 
 
 208 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus IV), 939 F.3d 567, 589 (3d Cir. 
2019) (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Studies in the record reinforce 
what most people old enough to recall the days before WiFi and iPads understand 
instinctively: the explosion of Internet sources has accompanied the decline of reliance on 
traditional media.”), cert. granted, No. 19–1231, 2020 WL 5847134 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 209 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 210 Cf. Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 188 (footnote omitted) (“It is important 
to be realistic about the limitations of judicial remedies . . . . The notion that, under current 
conditions, rights of participation and initiation can produce a kind of Habermasian ‘ideal 
speech situation’ is wildly romantic. There is, moreover, the familiar risks that judicial 
remedies will be based on a skewed understanding of a complex regulatory scheme or serve 
the preferences of the judges rather than promote genuine public interests.”). 
 211 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 52 (“[F]rom the cursory 
information that agencies reported for some mandatory reviews that have review periods as 
long as 10 years, it appears that agencies may devote limited time and resources to 
conducting these reviews . . . .”). See generally In the Matter of 2014 Quadrennial 
Regulatory Review, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864 (2016) (the FCC’s Report and Order combining the 
2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Reviews into one review). 
 212 Brent Orrell, Embracing Radical Uncertainty, L. & LIBR. (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/10/31/embracing-radical-uncertainty-blastland-review/ 
[https://perma.cc/BPD4-QW73]. 
 213 Cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
524 (1978) (“Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their 
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have 
not chosen to grant them.”). 
 214 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
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C. The Statutory Will of Congress Outweighs Regulatory Reliance 
Interests 
The difficulty of contemporary regulatory reform is further complicated by 
entrenched interests opposed to deregulation.215 Because administrative law 
decisions must be based upon a public record, the interests most unreceptive to 
agency action have incentive to pile unfavorable studies and comments onto the 
record.216 Agencies must then refute these additions in order to deregulate under 
hard look review—no matter how illogical the assertions may be.217 In 
rulemakings that propose to repeal rules, such contributions to the record may 
be fatal, as refuting all defenses of a rule is a substantively difficult and resource-
consuming task.218  
Put another way, prioritizing reliance interests over liberty creates a “first-
mover . . . advantage” that incentivizes agencies to regulate first, so that they 
may speak last on an issue.219 And since State Farm’s hard look review 
prioritizes tangible decision-making above all else,220 courts can afford to be 
especially skeptical of revocation actions, as there is no replacement for the to-
be-repealed rule. After all, as the logic goes, “[t]hrowing out [a rule] when it has 
worked and is continuing to work . . . is like throwing away [regulatees’] 
umbrella in a rainstorm because [they] are not getting wet.”221  
 
 215 See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 243. 
 216 See Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 585 (“Without a doubt, those with an 
incentive to oppose rules will tend to overstate the costs and perhaps even claim that if rules 
are finalized, terrible dislocations will occur.”). 
 217 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 41, at 1134 (“Numerous scholars . . . have contended 
that this [refutation] requirement imposes a crushing burden on rulemaking efforts by 
agencies which, in their vain efforts to document the rationality of their decisionmaking 
processes, must try to predict and answer every objection that some random, perhaps 
politically hostile, reviewing court might deem plausible.”). 
 218 See id. at 1134–35. 
 219 See, e.g., Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory 
Stability, 68 DUKE L.J. 1593, 1639 (2019). But cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly 
carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must 
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). For 
example, in reviewing cost-benefit analysis (CBA), “courts are more deferential to the first 
CBA than the next CBA, which can be compared against the first.” Cecot, supra, at 1639. 
This is problematic because a “judicial review asymmetry arguably works against 
deregulation because a deregulatory action is almost always a change from a prior regulatory 
status quo.” Id.; cf. supra Part IV.A.1. 
 220 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) 
(“If Congress established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that 
presumption . . . is not against safety regulation, but against changes in current policy that 
are not justified by the rulemaking record.”) (third emphasis added). 
 221 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Yet this logic, while natural,222 implicitly assumes that the weather will not 
change—that there are no sunny days ahead. In the case of formal retrospective 
review, this mindset keeps excess regulation on the books and wastes agencies’ 
resources on fruitless recurring reviews.223 That is time lost that an agency 
cannot get back. This Part examines the argument against thin rationality 
arbitrary and capricious review and explains why regulatees placing substantial 
reliance interests upon rules that are subject to formal retrospective review is 
misguided. 
1. Reliance Interests for Public Law Regulatory Entitlements Require 
Courts to Give Exceptional Weight to Statutory Text 
Although retrospective review of regulations is designed to alleviate 
burdens on regulated actors, legal stability can also be beneficial to markets.224 
The recognition of these interests, defined as regulatory “entitlements,” 
developed as public administrative law began to eclipse private common law 
over the course of the twentieth century.225 Legal entitlements were generally 
considered lesser than legal rights, but more worthy of defense than legal 
privileges.226 Courts, in granting legal protection to these artificial benefits, 
incentivized entrenched interests to strenuously defend their entitlements.227 
Simply put, interested parties rationally rely upon the private ordering that 
develops around existing regulation.228 Yet all good things must come to an 
end—or at least will probably need some revision over time.229 
 
 222 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34–35 (2008) (discussing status quo bias: the 
“general tendency to stick with [one’s] current situation”). 
 223 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 185–86. 
 224 See Margo Oge, Memo to the Auto Industry: Time to Join California and Leaders 




 225 See, e.g., Sunstein, Factions, supra note 48, at 278–79; Wood et al., supra note 144, 
at 459. 
 226 See Wood et al., supra note 144, at 459. 
 227 See id. at 461–62 (footnote omitted) (“[F]ederal common law, statutory 
interpretation, and constitutional doctrines have been worked . . . to turn regulatory 
protections into an entitlement enforceable by the courts. [These entitlements] are statutorily-
based, and the beneficiaries of these entitlements are not restricted to regulatees.”). 
 228 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 204. 
 229 See, e.g., Sunstein, Lookback, supra note 24, at 590. A driving force behind the 
emphasis on retrospective review in the Obama administration was the realization that 
“‘most regulations are subject to a cost-benefit analysis only in advance of their 
implementation,’” yet this is the time when agencies know the least about the rule’s effect—
causing agencies to make “‘potentially controversial assumptions.’” Id. As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has recognized, if a governing body doesn’t “choose the optimal rule to start 
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In shifting from private-based public law to independent public law, courts 
have had to reconsider what constitutes a judicially reviewable dispute.230 As a 
result of this shift, courts now focus on the “interest associated with a statute, 
rather than a traditional private right, . . . as the basis for invoking judicial 
relief.”231 Under this understanding, the highest priority for any court is the 
statute itself—and the entitlements that stem from rules authorized by it.232 
Indeed, as noted by Professor Sunstein in his Article, Deregulation and the 
Hard-Look Doctrine, “it is no longer feasible to understand the exclusive, or 
even the primary, judicial role as the promotion of private ordering. The role is 
instead to ensure that administrative agencies develop and implement the 
relevant public values—often authoritatively reflected in the will of 
Congress . . . .”233 Thus, under this dynamic, the highest good in judicial review 
of agency action must be the statutory combination of the governing substantive 
statute and APA.234 
The broader shift from private to public law features prominently in State 
Farm’s hard look review. In State Farm, the Supreme Court adopted the 
independent public law values that had been percolating from the District of 
Columbia Circuit.235 Rationalizing State Farm, Professor Sunstein argues that 
the APA’s judicial oversight function was intended to be extensive, in order to 
provide legitimacy to administrative decision making, compared to 
administrative norms prior to the adoption of the APA.236 According to 
Professor Sunstein, it is this scrutinizing “mood,”237 rather than the APA’s text 
 
with,” it must “be prepared to deal with the adaptations.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: 
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (1984). 
 230 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 179–89 (outlining the shift taking place 
in administrative law at the time of State Farm, from private-based public law to independent 
public law). 
 231 See id. at 180. Professor Sunstein states that hard look review is designed to 
“identif[y] goals in a way that conforms to the governing statute,” thus recognizing that the 
governing statute should be judicial review’s loadstar under independent public law. Id. at 
210. 
 232 See Wood et al., supra note 144, at 462; see also Walters, supra note 138, at 57–58 
(recognizing that the modern model for administrative law is “built around the supremacy of 
statutory law” and that “the purpose of administrative law is to facilitate the full 
implementation of Congress’s law and to properly incentivize Congress to use its legislative 
power”). 
 233 Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 203 (emphasis added). 
 234 See id. at 212. 
 235 See id. at 196. 
 236 See id. at 198–200. But see Seidenfeld, Deossification, supra note 133, at 484 (Under 
the APA, “notice and comment rulemaking was meant to allow an agency to adopt rules 
quickly and easily”). 
 237 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 200. In distinguishing the APA from 
the then-prevalent standard of review, rational basis review, hard look review can be seen, 
according to Professor Sunstein, as effectuating the purpose of the APA: “to increase judicial 
supervisory power.” Id. 
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itself, that justifies the emergence of hard look review.238 But then, moving back 
to the text, he notes that “[t]he APA itself defines rulemaking, which is generally 
reviewable, as ‘agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a 
rule,’”239 thus warranting no special deference to cases of deregulation.240 
Yet while this scrutinizing review may be justified under typical substantive 
legislation—which lacks provisions addressing regulatory review241—this is 
not the case for formal retrospective review statutes.242 Indeed, if ever there was 
an argument that warranted a more deferential standard of deregulatory judicial 
review, formal retrospective review was tailor-made to make it. 
2. In Formal Retrospective Review, Special Deference to Deregulation 
Is Warranted Under the Governing Substantive Statute’s Text 
What separates formal retrospective review from informal retrospective 
review is a statutory mandate.243 As shown in Part IV.B, under the current 
understanding of formal retrospective review, this mandate can at times be 
burdensome and unhelpful to agencies.244 But despite concerns over resource 
allocation, the micromanaging of agencies via formal retrospective review does 
come paired with the authority of the will of Congress—here, to “repeal or 
modify any regulation [the FCC] determines to be no longer in the public 
interest.”245 It is the “mood”246 of the substantive formal retrospective review 
statute that should give courts pause before they turn to the APA or 
administrative common law and apply hard look review in these challenges. 
Though administrative agencies have a duty to reason their actions under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, they do not have a duty to convert judges 
to their rationale.247 Courts in administrative disputes are designed to set a low 
 
 238 See id. at 210 (“The APA provides no clear authorization for the hard-look doctrine, 
which might therefore be regarded as a creation of federal common law.”). 
 239 Id. at 202. 
 240 See id. at 196; cf. supra Part IV.A.1. 
 241 See Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 188 (comparing informal review to the “‘formal’ 
reviews required by statute or executive order”). 
 242 Cf. Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 205 (“The ordinary way to tell the 
difference [between permissible and impermissible bases for decisions to deregulate] is to 
look at the governing substantive statute.”). 
 243 Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 188. 
 244 See supra notes 192–217 and accompanying text. 
 245 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 112 
(1996). 
 246 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 200. 
 247 Compare Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 
(1983) (“Our only task is to determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant 
factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”), 
with Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus IV), 939 F.3d 567, 587 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“The Commission might well be within its rights to adopt a new deregulatory 
framework . . . if it gave a meaningful evaluation of that effect and then explained why it 
believed the trade-off was justified for other policy reasons. . . . But based on the evidence 
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bar248—merely to ensure that agencies are not “depart[ing] from a prior policy 
sub silentio or simply disregard[ing] rules that are still on the books.”249 And in 
the deregulatory formal retrospective review context, courts have an even more 
limited role: simply ensuring the agency is following its statutory directives. 
This is because, as the Supreme Court recognized in Baltimore Gas, “[resolving] 
fundamental policy questions lies . . . with Congress and the agencies to which 
Congress has delegated authority . . . Congress has assigned the courts only the 
limited, albeit important, task of reviewing agency action to determine whether 
the agency conformed with controlling statutes.”250 In Prometheus and 
challenges under formal retrospective review statutes, that substantive policy 
decision—deregulation—was made when text of the statute was adopted by 
Congress;251 it is not for courts to second-guess.252 
In the case of the Quadrennial Review, Congress left courts little room for 
doubt. First, the FCC has forbearance authority: an explicit grant of power to 
“forbear from applying any regulation or any provision . . . if the Commission 
determines that . . . forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is 
consistent with the public interest.”253 Second, the FCC has authority to “repeal 
or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.”254 
Deciding what best serves the “public interest” has long been a policy choice 
for agencies to make.255 Yet despite this extensive statutory authorization, the 
FCC has still struggled to enact its desired reforms, in large part due to 
unjustified hard look review.256 The judicial application of hard look arbitrary 
and capricious review in the formal retrospective review context indicates that 
 
and reasoning the Commission has given us, we simply cannot say one way or the other. 
This violated the Commission’s obligations under the APA . . . .”), cert. granted, No. 19–
1231, 2020 WL 5847134 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2020). 
 248 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 19, at 1358 (“What is excluded by the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is genuinely ungrounded agency decisionmaking, in the sense that 
the agency cannot justify its action even as a response to the limits of reason.”). 
 249 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 250 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added). 
 251 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) 
(The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was adopted to “promote competition and reduce 
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers”). 
252 Cf. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 523–24 
(1978) (The Court held that § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act “established the 
maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose 
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. Agencies are free to grant additional 
procedural rights . . . but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the 
agencies have not chosen to grant them.”) (citation omitted). 
 253 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 254 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h) (emphasis added). 
 255 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 256 See supra Part III. 
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judges have centered their analyses on the administrative common law of the 
APA257—at the expense of substantive governing statutes’ legislative text. 
Congress can clear up this judicial bottleneck by amending the APA to add 
a thin rationality standard of review for static or deregulatory formal 
retrospective review actions—or courts can yield common law hard look review 
on their own. Either way, in giving primacy to the specific governing statute, 
not the APA or federal common law, judges in formal retrospective review 
cases, such as Prometheus I, II, III, or IV, will effectuate the will of Congress as 
it spoke to the substantive issue. In Prometheus, looking to the text of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 unambiguously reveals Congress’s directive 
for the FCC “to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications 
consumers . . . .”258 In short, it is difficult to rationalize how this now seventeen-
year back-and-forth comports with substantive statutory fidelity. 
As Sir Isaac Newton recognized centuries ago, objects in motion will stay 
in motion, unless acted upon by an outside force.259 Newton’s First Law of 
Motion can inform understanding of hard look review, as evidenced by the 
modern trend in federal rulemaking.260 In this sense, hard look review has acted 
as a force field, repelling deregulatory forces that would counteract expanding 
federal rulebooks. As Professor Sunstein has shown, this regulatory stare decisis 
can be justified as part of the judicial duty when statutes do not speak to the 
retrospective review process.261 But when statutes do speak to this process, 
under the force of the will of Congress, regulatory inertia must give way.262  
V. CONCLUSION 
The FCC’s Quadrennial Review and Prometheus I, II, III, and IV are prime 
examples of the glut of litigation that formal retrospective review requirements, 
under current standards of review, can create. By continuing with courts’ 
unjustified hard look standard of review and short review cycles, this trend will 
likely continue. Thus, before passing formal retrospective review requirements, 
 
 257 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 200 (“If the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ 
approach is taken to be highly deferential, one of the dominant purposes of the APA—to 
increase judicial supervisory power—would be frustrated by a shift to rulemaking and the 
rise of pre-enforcement review.”). 
 258 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) 
(emphasis added). 
 259 See Carol Hodanbosi, The First and Second Laws of Motion, NAT’L AERONAUTICS 
& SPACE ADMIN. (Aug. 1996), https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/WindTunnel/Activ 
ities/first2nd_lawsf_motion.html [https://perma.cc/3M7E-U9R4]. 
 260 See Walker, Restoring, supra note 11, at 1101–02 (noting that over 2015 and 2016, 
federal agencies added roughly 175,000 pages of rules to the Federal Register, while 
Congress added just 3,036 pages to the Statutes at Large over the same period). 
 261 See Sunstein, Deregulation, supra note 36, at 204–05. 
 262 Id. at 203 (The judicial role under public law is to “develop and implement the 
relevant public values—often authoritatively reflected in the will of Congress . . . ”). 
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Congress should distinguish courts’ standards of review: State Farm’s hard look 
arbitrary and capricious standard in pro-regulatory formal retrospective review 
actions and Baltimore Gas’s thin rationality arbitrary and capricious standard in 
deregulatory and static formal retrospective review actions. If courts are going 
to trust agency expertise in creating rules that bind the liberties of the public, 
sometimes based upon tangential statutory authority delegated decades prior,263 
it is only consistent to allow that same expertise to promote liberty by removing 
unnecessary regulatory burdens on the public. In short, “[i]t is not the role of the 
judiciary to second-guess the reasoned policy judgments of an administrative 
agency acting within the scope of its delegated authority.”264 It is regulatory 
humility from generalists that will allow President Roosevelt’s technocratic 
vision to survive increasing political and judicial scrutiny—and help Americans 
flourish under an up-to-date regulatory system that reflects modern 
circumstances. 
 
 263 See generally Adler & Walker, supra note 10 (discussing the temporal complications 
of delegation).  
 264 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (subsequent history omitted). 
 
